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“Evaluation” 
• Trusted hardware and software
• Cloud computing
“Exploitation” 
• MEDEX — “Media” — Hard drives, camera cards, GPS devices.
• CELEX — Cell phone
• DOCEX — Documents
• DOMEX — Document & Media Exploitation
Partners:
• Law Enforcement (FBI & Local)
• DHS (HSARPA; Video Games & Insider Threat)
• NSF (Courseware development)
• DoD
The Digital Evaluation and Exploitation (DEEP) Group:
Research in “trusted” systems and exploitation.
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1. Automation is essential.
• Today most forensic analysis is done manually.
• We are developing techniques & tools to allow automation.
2. Concentrate on the invisible.
• It’s easy to wipe a computer….
— but targets don’t erase what they can’t see.
• So we look for:
—Deleted and partially overwritten files.
—Fragments of memory in swap & hibernation.
—Tool marks.
3. Large amounts of data is essential.
• Most research is based on search & recognition
—10x the data produces 10x the false-positives
• We develop algorithms that work better with more data.
Three principles underly our research:
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corresponding to deleted files, the restart markers are
searched. After identifying any of the seven restart markers,
all the bits prior tomarker position are discarded and resulting
data is merged with the first part of the file or with the header
extracted from the original JPEG file and decoded. Recovered
files are displayed in Fig. 5. It can be seen that fragments of the
original file can be successfully recovered. It should be noted
that because the stored image size in the header is not
modified, in all cases images appear in the right size, but the
content is shifted.
5.2. Recovery of stand-alone fragments by use of pseudo
headers
Obviously without a valid header, a JPEG file or a part of it
cannot be decoded. Given this fact, in this section, we pose the
question of what information one will need to reconstruct
a pseudo header that can be utilized in decoding of a stand-
alone file fragment. The information that can be inferred by
analysis of encoded file data will not be sufficient to recon-
struct a file header. Our premise is that image files stored on
a recovery medium will be interrelated to some extent. This
relationmay exist because imagesmay have been captured by
the same camera, edited by the same software tools, or
downloaded from the same Web pages. All these factors
induce different levels of shared information among the
neighboring files in terms of their encoding properties which
may vary from image quality settings to specifications of the
encoder. Therefore, in essence, we will investigate the
possible use of encoding related information from recovered
files in recovery of stand-alone fragments.
Considering only baseline JPEG/JFIF images, the most
common JPEG encoding method used by most digital cameras
and on the Web, the information needed to encode/decode an
image can be categorized into four types. These are:
1. the width and height of the image specified in number of
pixels;
2. the 8! 8 quantization tables used during compression;
3. the number of color components and type of chroma sub-
sampling used in composition of MCUs; and
4. the Huffman code tables.
Decoder essentially needs image size so that the number of
MCUs can be computed and the image blocks obtained by
decoding of each of the MCUs can be laid out at their proper
locations on the image. Since the encoded values are not the
quantized values, but the associated quantizer bin values,
quantization tables are needed to perform de-quantization
prior to inverse-DCT transformation. The composition of
Fig. 5 – Recovered files after erasure of random amounts of data from tail (upper left), center (upper center and right), and
both header and tail parts (lower row) of the original image.
d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) S 8 8 – S 9 8 S95




Thursday, June 26, 14
Digital information is pervasive in today’s society.
Many sources of digital information:
• Desktops, laptops, servers
• Mobile devices: phones & tablets
• Cars
• Internet Services (Cloud)
“Digital forensics” — the recovery, analysis & use of this information
• Law enforcement — Document a conspiracy (stock fraud; murder-for-hire; Silk Road)
• DOD — Identify members of a terrorist organization.
• Cyber investigations — Find and understand malware
• Ordinary people — Recover deleted files.
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Typical computer might have:
• Millions of files; dozens of applications
• Data from many different people
• Information in many different formats
Digital forensic tools allow for:
• Viewing hidden information / recovery of deleted files




• Recover specific information critical to a case:
—Identity information (contacts, etc.) 
—Contraband information (stolen documents, criminal content)
These tools can also be used for:
• Privacy auditing; software testing
We need digital forensics because digital devices are 
exceedingly complex.
5
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The digital forensics process makes digital evidence 
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There is also a digital forensics ecology
Ecology driver: computer crime & crimes with computers.
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Data scale is a never-ending problem
Each year storage capacity & # investigations increases
Moore’s works against digital forensics!
• Each year targets get larger.
• Cases are becoming more complex — multiple devices, web-based services.
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Diversity: the second fundamental challenge
Analysts must be able to analyze any data found on any computer.
9
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Diversity produces fragmentation.




















RAM analysis RAM analysis RAM analysis
Network Forensics: Data flow Network Forensics: Data flow
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There are two approaches for addressing diversity.
Device-specific techniques 
• Solutions targeted at iOS, Android, Windows
• Pros:
—Can recover highly specific data
—Highly targeted
• Cons:
—Requires substantial reverse engineering.
—Often works with only a specific version. Expensive to maintain
• Examples: Celebrite (extraction), TaintDroid (analysis)
Generic techniques
• Pros — Broadly applicable.
• Cons — Less targeted; may require substantial post-processing.
• Example: file hashing  (content-based search & ignore lists.)
11
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✔This talk presents two bulk data analysis techniques for 
triage and full-content analysis.
Introducing digital forensics
and bulk data analysis.
    
12
Sector hashing and 
random sampling for 
high speed forensics
A research agenda ?
Optimistic decoding finds 
“invisible” information
It’s so hard that none of the commercial or open source 
digital forensic will show these email addresses.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This may be a serious problem.
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High speed forensic analysis 
with random sampling and sector 
hashing
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“Triage” prioritizes analysis & helps make go/no-go decisions.
Examples:
• Deciding which devices to search at a border crossing
• Which computers to search in an organization
• Which devices to analyze first
Simplified triage problem:
• What can we learn about a 1TB drive in five minutes?
• Possible approaches: 
—Find & extract critical files.  (Effective unless there is an active adversary)
—Randomly sample the drive, looking for relevant data.
14
Triage techniques are a promising approach for data 
overload
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We think of computers as devices with files.
15
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“hex dump:”
Storage devices organize data in blocks (sectors).
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a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
512 bytes = 1 sector
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Most digital forensics techniques process files.
Files are familiar:
• People are used to work with files
• Files fit well into the legal process
• Investigators can extract allocated files w/o special tools
“Bulk data” analysis complements file analysis:
• A lot of information is not in files!
—RAM, swap, hibernation files
• Files can be deleted & partially overwritten
• OS & Apps can be tricked into hiding information
—e.g. “Android Anti-forensics: Modifying CyanogenMod,” Karlsson & Glisson 2014
17
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This approach combines bulk data analysis with random 
sampling to make a triage decision.
18
It takes 3.5 hours to read the entire drive:
In 5 minutes you can read:
• 36 GB in one strip
• HDD: 100,000 randomly chosen 64KiB strips (3 msec/seek)
• SSD: 500,000 randomly chosen 64KiB strips (0 msec/seek)
Minutes 208 5 5 5
Data 1 TB 36 GB 6.5 GB 36 GB
# Seeks 1 1 100,000 500,000
% of data 100% 3.6% 0.65% 3.6%
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All data on computers are stored in sectors.
























“Deleted data” are on the disk, 
but data can only be recovered with forensic tools.
20
Deleted Data














Some sectors are blank. They have “No data.”
21
No Data
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Basic idea of random sampling: 
read random sectors and try to make sense of them.
22
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The Challenge for forensic sampling: 
interpreting each sector
“What data does this sector have?”
• Some sectors are easy to discern:
0000000: ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946 0001 0201 0048  ......JFIF.....H
0000010: 0048 0000 ffe1 1d17 4578 6966 0000 4d4d  .H......Exif..MM
0000020: 002a 0000 0008 0007 0112 0003 0000 0001  .■..............
0000030: 0001 0000 011a 0005 0000 0001 0000 0062  ...............b
0000040: 011b 0005 0000 0001 0000 006a 0128 0003  ...........j.(..
0000050: 0000 0001 0002 0000 0131 0002 0000 001b  .........1......
0000060: 0000 0072 0132 0002 0000 0014 0000 008d  ...r.2..........
0000070: 8769 0004 0000 0001 0000 00a4 0000 00d0  .i..............
0000080: 0000 0048 0000 0001 0000 0048 0000 0001  ...H.......H....
0000090: 4164 6f62 6520 5068 6f74 6f73 686f 7020  Adobe Photoshop 
00000a0: 4353 2057 696e 646f 7773 0032 3030 353a  CS Windows.2005:
00000b0: 3035 3a30 3920 3136 3a30 313a 3432 0000  05:09 16:01:42..
00000c0: 0000 0003 a001 0003 0000 0001 0001 0000  ................
00000d0: a002 0004 0000 0001 0000 00c8 a003 0004  ................
00000e0: 0000 0001 0000 0084 0000 0000 0000 0006  ................
00000f0: 0103 0003 0000 0001 0006 0000 011a 0005  ................
• Some are hard:
000a000: 0011 fa71 57f4 6f5f ddff 00bd 15fb 5dfd  ...qW.o_......].
000a010: a996 0fc9 dff1 ff00 b149 e154 97f4 efd5  .........I.T....
000a020: e3f5 7f47 71df 8ffb d5d7 da9e d87f c12f  ...Gq........../
000a030: f8ff 00d8 b1f4 b1f8 ff00 c57e ab7a ff00  ...........~.z..
24
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This is similar to other kinds of sampling.
The goal is to predict the population from the sample.
US elections can be predicted 
by sampling thousands of 
households:
25
Hard drive contents can be predicted 
by sampling thousands of sectors:
The challenge is interpreting the 
content of the sector that is sampled.
The challenge is identifying 
likely voters.
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Sampling can tell us about the content of the data
Sampling can tell us the proportion of...
—blank sectors; video; HTML files; other data types...
—data with distinct signatures...
...provided we can identify the data type of each sector.
26
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Many organizations discard used computers. 
Can we verify if a disk is properly wiped in 5 minutes?
Simple solution:
• 1. Read a random sector
—If there is data, the drive is not wiped.
• 2. Repeat until satisfied.
Simplify the problem.
Can we use statistical sampling to verify wiping?
27
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A 1TB drive has 2 billion sectors.
What if we read 10,000 and they are all blank?
28
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A 1TB drive has 2 billion sectors.
What if we read 10,000 and they are all blank?
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A 1TB drive has 2 billion sectors.
What if we read 10,000 and they are all blank?
Chances are good that they are all blank.
28
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If the disk has 1,999,999,999 blank sectors  (1 with data)
• The sample is representative of the population.
We will only find that 1 sector with exhaustive search.
.
Random sampling won't find a single written sector.
29
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If half of the sectors are blank...












Sampled 5,000 (50%) 5,000 (50%)
Total: 1,000,000,000 (50%) 1,000,000,000 (50%)
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What if the the sampled sectors 
are the only blank sectors?
If the the only sectors read are blank...
—We are incredibly unlucky.
















Sampled 10,000 (100%) 0 (0%)
Total: 10,000 (0.0005%) 1,999,990,000 (99%)
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This is an example of the "urn" problem from statistics
Assume a 1TB disk has 10MB of data.
• 1TB = 2,000,000,000 = 2 Billion 512-byte sectors!
• 10MB = 20,000 sectors
Read just 1 sector; the odds that it is blank are:
32
2, 000, 000, 000  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
= .99999
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This is an example of the "urn" problem from statistics
Assume a 1TB disk has 10MB of data.
• 1TB = 2,000,000,000 = 2 Billion 512-byte sectors!
• 10MB = 20,000 sectors
Read just 1 sector; the odds that it is blank are:
32
2, 000, 000, 000  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
= .99999
first pick second pick Odds we may have missed something
(
2, 000, 000, 000  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
)(
1, 999, 999, 999  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
) = .99998
Read 2 sectors. The odds that both are blank are:
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The more sectors picked, the less likely we are to miss the 
data….
33
stored in a database. Periodically, a subset of the meta-
data in the database is published as the NSRL Reference
Dataset (RDS), NIST Special Database 28.[22]
This paper does not address the possibility of retriev-
ing data from a disk sector that has been overwritten: we
assume that when a sector is written with new data the
previous contents of the sector are forever lost. Although
we understand that this issue is a subject to some matter
of debate, we know of no commercial or non-commercial
technology on the planet that can recover the contents of
an overwritten hard drive. Those who maintain otherwise
are invited to publish their experimental results.
1.2 Outline of this paper
Section 2 introduces the technique and applies it to the
problem of sanitization verification. Section 3 shows how
the technique can be extended to other important prob-
lems through the use of file fragment identification tools.
Section 5 discusses specific identifiers that we have writ-
ten and presents a new technique that we have developed
for creating these identifiers using a combination of in-
trospection and grid computing. Section 6 discusses our
application of this work to the classification of a test disk
image created with a 160GB Apple iPod. Section 7.1
presents opportunities for future research.
2 Random Sampling for Verification
Hard drives are frequently disposed of on the sec-
ondary market without being properly sanitized. Even
when sanitizing is attempted, it can be difficult to verify
that the sanitization has been properly performed.
A terabyte hard drive contains roughly 2 billion 512-
byte sectors. Clearly, the only way to verify that all of the
sectors are blank is to read every sector. In order to be sure
with a 95% chance of certainty (that is, with p < 0.05)
that there are no sectors with a trace of data, it would be
necessary to read 95% of the sectors. This would take
such a long amount of time that there is no practical reason
not to read the entire hard drive.
In many circumstances it is not necessary to verify that
all of a disk’s sectors are in fact blank: it may be sufficient
to determine that the vast majority of the drive’s storage
space has been cleared. For example, if a terabyte drive
has been used to store home mortgage applications, and if
each application is 10MB in size, it is sufficient to show
that less than 10MB of the 1TB drive contains sectors that
have been written to establish that the drive does not con-
tain a complete mortgage application. More generally, a
security officer may be satisfied that a drive has less than
10MB of data prior to disposal or repurposing.
2.1 Basic Theory
If the drive has 10MB of data, then 20,000 of the
drive’s 2 billion sectors have data. If a single sector is
sampled, the probability of finding one of those non-null
sectors is precisely:
20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
= 0.00001 = 10 5 (1)
This is pretty dreadful. Put another way, the probability
of not finding the data that’s on the disk is
2, 000, 000, 000  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
= 0.99999 (2)
Almost certainly the data will be missed by sampling a
single sector.
If two randomly chosen sectors are sampled, the prob-
ability of not finding the data on either sampling lowers
slightly to:
2, 000, 000, 000  20, 000
2, 000, 000, 000
⇥ 1, 999, 999, 999  20, 000
1, 999, 999, 999
= 0.99997999960000505 (3)
This is still dreadful, but there is hope, as each repeated
random sampling lowers the probability of not finding one
of those 20,000 sectors filled with data by a tiny bit.
This scenario is an instance of the well-known “Urn
Problem” from probability theory (described here with
nomenclature as in [7]). We are treating our disk as an
urn that has N balls (two billion disk sectors) of one of
two colors, white (blank sectors) and black (not-blank
sectors). We hypothesize that M (20,000) of those balls
are black. Then a sample of n balls drawn without re-
placement will have X black balls. The probability that
the random variable X will be exactly x is governed by
the hypergeometric distribution:








This distribution resolves to a form simpler to compute
when seeking the probability of finding 0 successes (disk
sectors with data) in a sample, which we also inductively
demonstrated above:
P (X = 0) =
n⇤
i=1
((N   (i  1)) M)
(N   (i  1)) (5)
Because this calculation can be computationally inten-
sive, we resort to approximating the hypergeometric dis-
tribution with the binomial distribution. This is a proper
simplification so long as the sample size is at most 5%
of the population size [7]. Analyzing a 1TB hard drive,
we have this luxury until sampling 50GB (which would
be slow enough to defeat the advantages of the fast anal-
ysis we propose). Calculating the probability of finding 0
3










Table 1: Probability of not finding any of 10MB of data on
a 1TB hard drive for a given number of randomly sampled
sectors. Smaller probabilities indicate higher accuracy.
Non-null data Probability of not finding data
Sectors Bytes with 10,000 sampled sectors
20,000 10 MB 0.90484
100,000 50 MB 0.60652
200,000 100 MB 0.36786
300,000 150 MB 0.22310
400,000 200 MB 0.13531
500,000 250 MB 0.08206
600,000 300 MB 0.04976
70 ,000 350 MB 0.03018
1,000,000 500 MB 0.00673
Table 2: Probability of not finding various amounts
of data when sampling 10,000 disk sectors randomly.
Smaller probabilities indicate higher accuracy.
colors, white (blank) sectors and black (non-blank) sec-
tors. We hypothesize that M (20,000) of those balls are
black. A sample of n balls is drawn without replacement,
andX of these drawn balls are black. The probability that
X will be exactly x is governed by the hypergeometric
distribution:








This distribution resolves to a form that is simpler to
compute when seeking the probability of X = 0, that is,
of finding no black balls (or no disk sectors containing
data):
P (X = 0) =
nY
i=1
((N   (i  1)) M)
(N   (i  1)) (5)
This is the same formula that we demonstrated with
induction in (3).
While this formula is computationally intensive, it can
be approximated with the binomial distribution when the
sample size is less than 5% of the population size [4] with
this approximation:









Interperting this equation can be a bit difficult, as there
are two free variables and a double-negative. That is, the
user determines the number of sectors to be randomly
sampled and the hypothesis to be invalidated—in this
case, the hypothesis is that the disk contains more than
a certain amount of data. Then, if all of the sectors that
are read contain no data, the equation provides the proba-
bility that the data are on the disk but have been missed. If
this probability is small enough then we can assume that
the hypothesis is not valid and the data are not on the disk.
Tables 1 and 2 look at this equation in two different
ways. Table 1 hypothesizes 10MB of data on a 1TB drive
and examines the probability of missing the data with dif-
ferent numbers of sampled sectors. Table 2 assumes that
10,000 sectors will be randomly sampled and reports the
probability of not finding increasing amounts data.
In the social sciences it is common to use 5% as an
acceptable level for statistical tests. According to Table 2,
if 10,000 sectors are randomly sampled from a 1TB hard
drive and they are all blank, then one can say with 95%
confidence that the disk has less than 300MB of data (p <
.05). The drive may have no data (D0), or it may have one
byte of data (D1), but it probably has less than 300MB.1
For law enforcement and military purposes, we believe
that a better probability cutoff is p < .01—that is, we
would like to be wrong not with 1 chance in 20, but with
1 chance in 100. For this level of confidence, 500,000 sec-
tors on the hard drive must be sampled to be “sure” that
there is less than 10MB of data, and sampling 10,000 sec-
tors only allows one to maintain that the 1TB drive con-
tains at most 500MB of data.
2.3 In Defense of Random Sampling
In describing this work to others, we are sometimes
questioned regarding our decision to employ random sam-
pling. Some suggest that much more efficient sampling
can be performed by employing a priori knowledge of
the process that was used to write the data to the storage
device in the first place.
For example, if an operating system only wrote suc-
1Of course, the drive may have 1,999,980,000 sectors
of data and the person doing the sampling may just be
incredibly unlucky; this might happen if the Data Hider is
able to accurately predict the output of the random number
generator used for picking the sectors to sample.
3
—Pick 500,000 random sectors
—If are all NULL, the disk has p=(1-.00673) chance of having 10MB of non-NULL data
—The disk has a 99.3% chance of having less than 10MB of data
Thursday, June 26, 14
We sample 64KiB blocks instead of 512-byte sectors
Sample with 64KiB “blocks” instead of 512-byte sectors.
• It takes the same amount of time to read 65,536 bytes as 512 bytes
• Analyze 64KiB block with a 4KiB sliding window 






Update results in real-time
• Provides immediate feedback
• Catches important data faster
• Stop when analyst is satisfied.
34
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The challenge: identifying a file “type” from a fragment.
Can you identify a JPEG file











[FF D8 FF E0] or [FF D8 FF E1]
[FF D9]
JPEG File41,572 bytes
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Machine learning can identify file type of file “fragments.”
Features: unigram & bigram frequency.
36
For example, JPEGs have many “FF00” bigrams
FF00
Thursday, June 26, 14
We determined:
• % of free space; % JPEG; % encrypted
—Simson Garfinkel, Vassil Roussev, Alex Nelson and Douglas White, 
Using purpose-built functions and block hashes to enable small block and sub-file 
forensics, DFRWS 2010, Portland, OR
With random sampling, we accurately predicted the storage 
allocations reported by iTunes
37
Audio Data reported by iTunes: 2.25 GiB 2.42 GB
MP3 files reported by file system: 2.39 GB
Estimated MP3 usage with random sampling : 2.49 GB 10,000 random samples
2.71 GB 5,000 random samples
Figure 1: Usage of a 160GB iPod reported by iTunes 8.2.1 (6) (top), as reported by the file system (bottom center), and
as computing with random sampling (bottom right). Note that iTunes usage actually in GiB, even though the program
displays the “GB” label.
length offset. If a frame is recognized from byte pat-
terns and the next frame is found at the specified off-
set, then there is a high probability that the fragment
contains an excerpt of the media type in question.
Field validation Once headers or frames are recognized,
they can be validated by “sanity checking” the fields
that they contain.
n-gram analysis As some n-grams are more common
than others, discriminators can base their results
upon a statistical analysis of n-grams in the fragment.
Other statistical tests Tests for entropy and other statis-
tical properties can be employed.
Context recognition Finally, if a fragment cannot be
readily discriminated, it is reasonable to analyze the
adjacent fragments. This approach works for frag-
ments found on a hard drive, as most files are stored
contiguously[15]. This approach does not work for
identifying fragments in physical memory, however,
as modern memory systems make no effort to co-
locate adjacent fragments in the computer’s physical
memory map.
4.3 Three Discriminators
In this subsection we present three discriminators that
we have created. Each of these discriminators was devel-
oped in Java and tested on the NPS govdocs1 file corpus
[16], supplemented with a collection of MP3 and other
files that were developed for this project.
To develop each of these discriminators we started
with a reading of the file format specification and a vi-
sual examination of file exemplars using a hex editor (the
EMACS hexl mode), the Unix more command, and the
Unix strings command. We used our knowledge of file
types to try to identify aspects of the specific file format
that would be indicative of the type and would be unlikely
to be present in other file types. We then wrote short test
programs to look for the features or compute the relevant
statistics for what we knew to be true positives and true
negatives. For true negatives we used files that we thought
would cause significant confusion for our discriminators.
4.3.1 Tuning the discriminators
Many of our discriminators have tunable parameters.
Our approach for tuning the discriminators was to use a
grid search. That is, we simply tried many different possi-
ble values for these parameters within a reasonable range
and selected the parameter value that worked the best. Be-
cause we knew the ground truth we were able to calcu-
late the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate
(FPR) for each combination of parameter settings. The
(FPR,TPR) for the particular set of values was then plot-
ted as an (X,Y) point, producing a ROC curve[25].
4.3.2 JPEG Discriminator
To develop our JPEG discriminator we started by read-
ing the JPEG specification. We then examined a number
of JPEGs, using as our source the JPEGs from the gov-
docs1 corpus[16].
JPEG is a segment-based container file in which each
segment begins with a FF byte followed by segment
identifier. Segments can contain metadata specifying the
size of the JPEG, quantization tables, Huffman tables,
Huffman-coded image blocks, comments, EXIF data, em-
bedded comments, and other information. Because meta-
data and quantization tables are more-or-less constant and
the number of blocks is proportional to the size of the
JPEG, small JPEGs are dominated by metadata while
large JPEGs are dominated by encoded blocks.
The JPEG format uses the hex character FF to indi-
cate the start of segments. Because this character may oc-
cur naturally in Huffman-coded data, the JPEG standard
specifies that naturally occurring FFs must be “stuffed”
(quoted) by storing them as FF00.
Our JPEG discriminator uses these characteristics to
identify Huffman-coded JPEG blocks. Our intuition was
to look for blocks that had high entropy but which had
more FF00 sequences than would be expected by chance.
We developed a discriminator that would accept a block as
JPEG data if the entropy was considered high—that is, if
7
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[FF D8 FF E0] or [FF D8 FF E1]
[FF D9]
41,572 bytes
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The 41K JPEG is a sequence of 88 blocks (each 512 bytes)
39
Block # Hex Values...
0 ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946 0001 0201 0048...
1 0c0c 0c0c ffc0 0011 0800 6a00 a003 0122...
2 4fa7 7567 ded2 cac5 8c82 2bf4 9e1c 23f9...
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Each block has a cryptographic hash.
Some are distinct, others are common.
Question: Do any of these hash values appear in other files?
40
Block # Byte Range MD5■(block(N))
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Should these block hashes be in other files?
Specific byte sequences in high-entropy data are very rare.
• 512 bytes = 256512 =101,233 possible sectors
But metadata might be common:
• Specific headers
• Common color tables
• “all black”
We need to survey 
a large samples of JPEGs
to find out which hashes are 
















[FF D8 FF E0] or [FF D8 FF E1]
[FF D9]
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Created by NPS DEEP lab in 2010
• ≈1 million heterogeneous files
—Documents (Word, Excel, PDF, etc.); Images (JPEG, PNG, etc.)
—Database Files; HTML files; Log files; XML
• Freely redistributable; 100s of different file types
• This database was surprising difficulty to collect, curate, and distribute:
—Scale created data collection and management problems.
—Copyright, Privacy & Provenance issues.
Advantages: persistence & copyright
42
GOVDOCS1: 1 million files from USG web servers
      <abstract>This data set contains data for birds caught 
with mistnets and with other means for sampling Avian 
Influenza (AI)….</abstract>
 <abstract>NOAA&apos;s National Geophysical Data Center 
(NGDC) is building high-resolution digital elevation models 
(DEMs) for select U.S. coastal regions. … </abstract>
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We examined sector hashes from ≃4 million files
≃ 1 million in GOVDOCS1 collection
• 109,282 JPEGs (including 000107.jpg)
≃ 3 million samples of Windows malware
Results:
• Most of the block hashes in 000107.jpg do not appear elsewhere in the corpus.
• Some of the block hashes appeared in other JPEGs.
• None of the block hashes appeared in files that were not JPEGs
43
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The beginning of 000107.jpg contained distinct hashes...
hash                                location             count
dc0c20abad42d487a74f308c69d18a5a   offset 0-511            1 !
9e7bc64399ad87ae9c2b545061959778   offset 512-1023         1
6e7f3577b100f9ec7fae18438fd5b047   offset 1024-1535        1
4594899684d0565789ae9f364885e303   offset 1536-2047        1
4d21b27ceec5618f94d7b62ad3861e9a   offset 2048-2559        1
03b6a13453624f649bbf3e9cd83c48ae   offset 2560-3071        1
c996fe19c45bc19961d2301f47cabaa6   offset 3072-3583        1
0691baa904933c9946bbda69c019be5f   offset 3584-4095        1
1bd9960a3560b9420d6331c1f4d95fec   offset 4096-4607        1
52ef8fe0a800c9410bb7a303abe35e64   offset 4608-5119        1
b8d5c7c29da4188a4dcaa09e057d25ca   offset 5120-5631        1
3d7679a976b91c6eb8acd1bfa3414f96   offset 5632-6143        1
8649f180275e0b63253e7ee0e8fa4c1d   offset 6144-6655        1
60ebc8acb8467045e9dcbe207f61a6c2   offset 6656-7167        1
440c1c1318186ac0e42b2977779514a1   offset 7168-7679        1
72686172f8c865231e2b30b2829e3dd9   offset 7680-8191        1
fdff55c618d434416717e5ed45cb407e   offset 8192-8703        1
fcd89d71b5f728ba550a7bc017ea8ff1   offset 8704-9215        1
2d733e47c5500d91cc896f99504e0a38   offset 9216-9727        1
2152fdde0e0a62d2e10b4fecc369e4c6   offset 9728-10239       1
692527fa35782db85924863436d45d7f   offset 10240-10751      1
76dbb9b469273d0e0e467a55728b7883   offset 10752-11263      1
44
JPEG Header
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The middle of 000107.JPG appear elsewhere...
hash                                location             count
9df886fdfa6934cc7dcf10c04be3464a   offset 14848-15359         1
95399e7ecc7ba1b38243069bdd5c263a   offset 15360-15871         1
ef1ffcdc11162ecdfedd2dde644ec8f2   offset 15872-16383         1
7eb35c161e91b215e2a1d20c32f4477e   offset 16384-16895         1 
38f9b6f045db235a14b49c3fe7b1cec3   offset 16896-17407         1
edceba3444b5551179c791ee3ec627a5   offset 17408-17919         1
6bc8ed0ce3d49dc238774a2bdeb7eca7   offset 17920-18431         1 
5070e4021866a547aa37e5609e401268   offset 18432-18943        14
13d33222848d5b25e26aefb87dbdf294   offset 18944-19455      9198
0dfcde85c648d20aed68068cc7b57c25   offset 19456-19967      9076
756f0bbe70642700aafb2557bf2c5649   offset 19968-20479      9118
c2c29016d3005f7a1df247168d34e673   offset 20480-20991      9237
42ff3d72b2b25f880be21fac46608cc9   offset 20992-21503      9708
b943cd0ea25e354d4ac22b886045650d   offset 21504-22015      9615
a003ec2c4145b0bc871118842b74f385   offset 22016-22527      9564
1168c351f57aad14de135736c06665ea   offset 22528-23039         7
51a50e6148d13111669218dc40940ce5   offset 23040-23551        83
365b122f53075cb76b39ca1366418ff9   offset 23552-24063        83
9ad9660e7c812e2568aaf063a1be7d05   offset 24064-24575        84
67bd01c2878172e2853f0aef341563dc   offset 24576-25087        84
fc3e47d734d658559d1624c8b1cbf2c1   offset 25088-25599        84
cb9aef5b7f32e2a983e67af38ce8ff87   offset 25600-26111         1
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Example: Block 37 had 9198 collisions..
The sector is filled with blank lines 100 characters long...
13d33222848d5b25e26aefb87dbdf294   offset 18944-19455      9198
$ dd if=000107.jpg skip=18944 count=512 bs=1|xxd
0000000: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000010: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 0a20 2020              .   
0000020: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000030: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000040: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000050: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000060: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000070: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000080: 200a 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020   .              
0000090: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
00000a0: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
00000b0: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
00000c0: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
00000d0: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
00000e0: 2020 2020 2020 0a20 2020 2020 2020 2020        .         
00000f0: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000100: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000110: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000120: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000130: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000140: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 200a 2020 2020             .    
0000150: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020                  
0000160: 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
...                
...
46
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Block 45 has 83 collisions.
It also appears to contain EXIF metadata
51a50e6148d13111669218dc40940ce5   offset 23040-23551        83
$ dd if=000107.jpg skip=23040 count=512 bs=1|xxd
0000000: 3936 362d 322e 3100 0000 0000 0000 0000  966-2.1.........
0000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0058 595a 2000 0000  .........XYZ ...
0000040: 0000 00f3 5100 0100 0000 0116 cc58 595a  ....Q........XYZ
0000050: 2000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000   ...............
0000060: 0058 595a 2000 0000 0000 006f a200 0038  .XYZ ......o...8
0000070: f500 0003 9058 595a 2000 0000 0000 0062  .....XYZ ......b
0000080: 9900 00b7 8500 0018 da58 595a 2000 0000  .........XYZ ...
0000090: 0000 0024 a000 000f 8400 00b6 cf64 6573  ...$.........des
00000a0: 6300 0000 0000 0000 1649 4543 2068 7474  c........IEC htt
00000b0: 703a 2f2f 7777 772e 6965 632e 6368 0000  p://www.iec.ch..
00000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0016 4945 4320 6874  ..........IEC ht
00000d0: 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e69 6563 2e63 6800  tp://www.iec.ch.
00000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0064 6573  .............des
0000110: 6300 0000 0000 0000 2e49 4543 2036 3139  c........IEC 619
0000120: 3636 2d32 2e31 2044 6566 6175 6c74 2052  66-2.1 Default R
0000130: 4742 2063 6f6c 6f75 7220 7370 6163 6520  GB colour space 
0000140: 2d20 7352 4742 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  - sRGB..........
0000150: 002e 4945 4320 3631 3936 362d 322e 3120  ..IEC 61966-2.1 
0000160: 4465 6661 756c 7420 5247 4220 636f 6c6f  Default RGB colo
0000170: 7572 2073 7061 6365 202d 2073 5247 4200  ur space - sRGB.
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Block 48 had 84 collisions..
It appears to contain part of a JPEG color table...
67bd01c2878172e2853f0aef341563dc   offset 24576-25087        84
$ dd if=000107.jpg skip=24576 count=512 bs=1 |xxd
0000000: 7a27 ab27 dc28 0d28 3f28 7128 a228 d429  z'.'.(.(?(q(.(.)
0000010: 0629 3829 6b29 9d29 d02a 022a 352a 682a  .)8)k).).■.■5■h■
0000020: 9b2a cf2b 022b 362b 692b 9d2b d12c 052c  .■.+.+6+i+.+.,.,
0000030: 392c 6e2c a22c d72d 0c2d 412d 762d ab2d  9,n,.,.-.-A-v-.-
0000040: e12e 162e 4c2e 822e b72e ee2f 242f 5a2f  ....L....../$/Z/
0000050: 912f c72f fe30 3530 6c30 a430 db31 1231  ././.050l0.0.1.1
0000060: 4a31 8231 ba31 f232 2a32 6332 9b32 d433  J1.1.1.2■2c2.2.3
0000070: 0d33 4633 7f33 b833 f134 2b34 6534 9e34  .3F3.3.3.4+4e4.4
0000080: d835 1335 4d35 8735 c235 fd36 3736 7236  .5.5M5.5.5.676r6
0000090: ae36 e937 2437 6037 9c37 d738 1438 5038  .6.7$7`7.7.8.8P8
00000a0: 8c38 c839 0539 4239 7f39 bc39 f93a 363a  .8.9.9B9.9.9.:6:
00000b0: 743a b23a ef3b 2d3b 6b3b aa3b e83c 273c  t:.:.;-;k;.;.<'<
00000c0: 653c a43c e33d 223d 613d a13d e03e 203e  e<.<.="=a=.=.> >
00000d0: 603e a03e e03f 213f 613f a23f e240 2340  `>.>.?!?a?.?.@#@
00000e0: 6440 a640 e741 2941 6a41 ac41 ee42 3042  d@.@.A)AjA.A.B0B
00000f0: 7242 b542 f743 3a43 7d43 c044 0344 4744  rB.B.C:C}C.D.DGD
0000100: 8a44 ce45 1245 5545 9a45 de46 2246 6746  .D.E.EUE.E.F"FgF
0000110: ab46 f047 3547 7b47 c048 0548 4b48 9148  .F.G5G{G.H.HKH.H
0000120: d749 1d49 6349 a949 f04a 374a 7d4a c44b  .I.IcI.I.J7J}J.K
0000130: 0c4b 534b 9a4b e24c 2a4c 724c ba4d 024d  .KSK.K.L■LrL.M.M
0000140: 4a4d 934d dc4e 254e 6e4e b74f 004f 494f  JM.M.N%NnN.O.OIO
0000150: 934f dd50 2750 7150 bb51 0651 5051 9b51  .O.P'PqP.Q.QPQ.Q
0000160: e652 3152 7c52 c753 1353 5f53 aa53 f654  .R1R|R.S.S_S.S.T
0000170: 4254 8f54 db55 2855 7555 c256 0f56 5c56  BT.T.U(UuU.V.V\V
0000180: a956 f757 4457 9257 e058 2f58 7d58 cb59  .V.WDW.W.X/X}X.Y
0000190: 1a59 6959 b85a 075a 565a a65a f55b 455b  .YiY.Z.ZVZ.Z.[E[
00001a0: 955b e55c 355c 865c d65d 275d 785d c95e  .[.\5\.\.]']x].^
48
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With blocks of 512 bytes and 4KiB, the vast majority of 
sectors had distinct hashes.
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randomly generated blocks would have the same 
content. The randomness of user-generated content 
is less than 8 bits per byte, of course, but even for 
content that has entropy of 2 bits per byte, a 512-
byte block still contains 1,024 bits of entropy, again 
making it very unlikely that two blocks will be the 
same.
As Table 1 shows, all kinds of user-generated con-
tent, including word processing files, photos, and 
video, contain sectors that are not seen elsewhere—
that is, distinct blocks according to our definition. 
The frequency of distinct blocks in the OpenMalware 
2012 and 2009 NSRL RDS datasets is significantly 
lower but still quite high. However, our experiments 
make it clear that it is impossible to assume a priori 
that a given singleton block is distinct.
Origin of nondistinct blocks 
To better understand the root causes of nondistinct 
blocks, we analyzed the most common blocks from each 
corpus. Our original intuition was that blocks that had low 
entropy or that contained repeating byte patterns would 
occur frequently. We found that many of the common 
blocks indeed had these characteristics.
As expected, the block of all NUL (0×00) bytes was 
the most common block across all corpora. But we found 
other examples as well. For instance, there were more than 
200,000 occurrences of an Adobe PDF internal data struc-
ture in the Govdocs corpus. Likewise, we found several 
common blocks that contained Microsoft Office internal 
structures.
Several high-entropy blocks were common in the 
OpenMalware 2012 dataset. We found that these blocks 
occurred in different files but always at the same byte 
offset. Further analysis revealed that the containing files 
were actually different variants of the same malware, as 
reported by several antivirus tools on VirusTotal.com. The 
repeated blocks did not appear in any legitimate files listed 
in the 2009 NSRL RDS corpus. Clearly, these blocks are 
unique to a specific malware family and not general ex-
ecutables or other system files.
Although traditional file identification techniques re-
quire each variant’s hash, our findings show that shared 
blocks can identify some malware variants. We suspect 
that these common malware blocks are the result of hand-
patching existing malware and code reuse, or elementary 
attempts to change a file hash by adding bytes to the end 
of the file. 
BLOCK HASH DATABASE
To develop a useful system for performing sector analy-
sis, it is not enough to choose which or what size blocks 
should be used to capture a target dataset. It is necessary 
to, first, efficiently store the hashes for the target blocks 
and, second, check quickly enough to determine whether 
disk sectors are present in the dataset.
Performance requirements 
Our goal is to create a database of one billion file block 
hashes that can be field deployed on a laptop. The data-
base should be fast enough to support searches of hashes 
that are created by reading a consumer hard drive at the 
maximum I/O transfer rate (assuming that hashing is free). 
Given that it takes approximately 200 minutes to read the 
contents of a Tbyte-size hard drive, this translates to a 
database that can perform roughly 150,000 hash lookups 
per second. With a billion 512-byte block hashes, the data-
base would allow identification of 512 gigabytes of known 
content, a number that is sufficient for many applications. 
Because hash values are evenly distributed, the database 
can be trivially parallelized using prefix routing.4 A cluster 
with 1,000 such databases could thus support 1012 block 
hashes and address half a petabyte of known content.
Instead of hashing every sector of the drive, it is possible 
to conduct an exhaustive investigation sampling only one 
million randomly chosen sectors. Although the sample con-
tains only 0.05 percent of the drive, there is a 98.17 percent 
chance of detecting 4 Mbytes of known content, provided 
that each of those 8,000 blocks is in the database. 
This is an instance of the well-known “urn problem” in 
statistics, which describes the probability of pulling some 
number of red beans out of an urn that contains a mix of 
randomly distributed red and black beans. In this case, the 
red beans are distinct sectors, there are 8,000 (C) of them 
distributed randomly, there are two billion beans in total 
(N), and one million (n) are selected randomly. The prob-
ability p of not finding even a single red bean in n draws is
 
p =1 − 
N  − (i  − 1)( ) − C( )




Applying this equation to 500,000 and 250,000 randomly 
selected sectors, we find that the chance of detecting 
Table 1. Incidence of singleton, paired, and common sectors  
in three file corpora. 
No. of blocks Govdocs OpenMalware 2012 2009 NSRL RDS
Block size: 512 bytes
Singleton 911.4 M   (98.93%) 1,063.1 M   (88.69%) N/A
Pair      7.1 M        (.77%)       75.5 M     (6.30%) N/A
Common     2.7 M        (.29%)       60.0 M     (5.01%) N/A
Block size: 4 kibibytes
Singleton  117.2 M   (99.46%)     143.8 M   (89.51%) 567.0 M   (96.00%)
Pair     0.5 M        (.44%)          9.3 M     (5.79%)   16.4 M      (2.79%)
Common     0.1 M        (.11%)          7.6 M     (4.71%)      7.1 M      (1.21%)
Young, Foster, Garfinkel & Fairbanks, IEEE Computer, Dec. 2012
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File systems align most files on sector boundaries.
We match file block hashes with disk sector hashes.
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Using distinct sectors in media sampling and full media analysis to detect presence of documents from a corpus, 
Kristina Foster, NPS Master’s Thesis, 2012
Block # Byte Range MD5*(block(N))





Thursday, June 26, 14
This means we can use distinct sectors to find known 
content.
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Method #1 — Random sampling
• Read & hash randomly chosen sectors.
• Lookup hash values in a database of block hashes.
• Distinct hash implies presence of files.
• Advantage: Can find presence of target content very quickly
Method #2 — Full media sampling
• Read & hash every disk sector.
• Lookup hash values in a database of block hashes.
• Distinct hash imply presence of files.
• Advantage: Can find a single sector of target content
• Disadvantage: Requires a very fast database
—1TB data in 208 minutes 
≃ 80 Mbyte/sec
≃ 150,000 512-byte sectors/sec
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Figure 1.1: Because files are stored on sector boundaries, we can search disk sectors for file blocks, or fixed-sized
chunks of data equal in size to the disk sectors. We create a file block hash database that contains block hashes for
every file that we have ever seen during an investigation. A database with 1 billion 512 B block hashes can reference
476 GB of content. Sector hashing depends on the existence of distinct file blocks, or blocks that only occur as a
copy in the original file. With full media analysis, all 4 billion sectors from the 2 TB drive are compared to the file
block hash database. With media sampling, only 1 million of the 2 billion sectors from the 1 TB drive are compared to
identify a 4 MB file that has all distinct blocks with 98.17% accuracy. If block B is seen on a disk sector, then there
is a good chance that File 1 also exists on the disk. Block B only occurs in one file in our large corpus of known files
and is effectively distinct. If Block A is seen on a disk sector, then we are not sure if any of the files exist. Block A is
non-distinct. Sector hashing can quickly identify fully intact and incomplete files that contain distinct blocks.
This example demonstrates the use of sector hashing to identify the presence of three files (1,
2 & 3) on the subject media. The block hash database contains all of the blocks from a corpus
of every file that has ever been seen during an investigation. The database is a key-value store
where the key is a hash of a file block and the value is a list of every file in which the block
occurs.
Figure 1.1 is a graphical representation of a 2 TB disk that has four billion 512-byte sectors. It
contains three previously seen files; File 1, File 2 and File 3. File 1 and File 2 are both 60 KB
JPEG images that have 120 512-byte blocks, matching the sector size. The files are intact,
which means that every file block is currently stored in a disk sector. As shown in Figure 1.1,
2
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Combining a Bloom filter & database, 
we can perform up to 2.7M TPS on low-cost hardware
Hardware: 8GiB Laptop; 250GB external SSD.
—“Distinct sector hashes for target file detection,” Young, Garfinkel, Foster & 
Fairbanks, IEEE Computer, Dec. 2012
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days to create a billion-record hash map, while it took less 
than four hours on a slower, AMD Opteron 6174-based 
system (2.2 GHz, 512-KiByte L2 cache) with 256 GiBytes 
of RAM. 
We found that creating some locality by first building 
the database as a flat map and then converting to either a 
B-tree or hash map was faster than generating the B-tree 
or hash map directly. Likewise, we found that tuning 
the Linux operating system parameters dirty_ratio, 
dirty_background_ratio, and dirty_expire_centisecs 
to allow dirty pages to stay in memory longer improved 
performance by helping the OS use the disk cache more 
efficiently. 
When fielding systems using the block hash database, 
system memory and I/O speed are the prime drivers. A 
drive triage system must be able to read disk sectors as fast 
as possible from a subject drive and test hashes of those 
sectors against the database. Large RAM allows caching 
more of the database, reducing I/O pressure. The database 
should be stored on a solid state drive (SSD) to further 
speed I/O, since every lookup will require one or more 
random seeks within the database file. 
For systems supporting fixed sites, such as a customs 
and immigration checkpoint, a large memory server or 
cluster can maintain the entire database in RAM and sup-
port several triage stations over a gigabit network.
Back-end testing
We performed back-end testing with databases contain-
ing 100 million and 1 billion records. The tests were done 
on a laptop with 8 GiBytes of RAM, a 2.67-GHz processor, 
and a 250-Gbyte SSD attached via eSATA and USB2 drives. 
We performed additional testing on a desktop system with 
24 GiBytes of RAM and spinning media. All runs were per-
formed with 50/50 random blends of database hits and 
misses, which might be unrealistically pessimistic. To 
guarantee that no part of the database was already loaded 
in memory, we directed the OS to stop caching all disk files 
by syncing the disks and then writing a “3” into /proc/sys/
vm/drop_caches between each run.
Table 2 shows the read transactions per second against 
the 100 million and one billion record databases after one 
million lookups (2-384 seconds, depending on the row) and 
at 1,200 seconds, obtained with the four back-end strate-
gies and B-tree with and without preload. Performance 
graphs for all of the runs are available at http://domex.
nps.edu/deep.
The hash map offered the best performance at 100 mil-
lion records, followed in order by the red/black tree, the flat 
map, and the B-trees. There was a factor-of-eight difference 
for queries that were present, but only a 40 percent spread 
for queries that were not present. In all cases, we observed 
that database misses were dramatically faster than hits, a 
result of prefiltering with the Bloom filter. The back-end 
performance is still relevant for misses, however, due to 
the false positives. We also observed that very large Bloom 
filters negatively impacted speed because of increased 
memory pressure. At one billion records, we obtained the 
best performance with M = 33 for the no-preload B-tree. 
Note that while the hash map outperformed the other strat-
egies at 100 million records, B-trees overall dominated all 
other strategies by a factor of almost 30 (300 times better 
than the classic databases). The USB2 drive was roughly 
half the speed of the eSATA drive.
In sum, for billion-record hash databases, the B-tree 
is the best choice. For smaller datasets, the hash map 
Table 2. Total transactions per second (TPS) for best execution. 
Bloom filter Database TPS at 1 M lookups TPS at 1,200 seconds
k M Size Strategy Size Present Absent Present Absent
100 million records
3 31 257 MiBytes B-tree (preload) 2.3 GiBytes 35.3 K 49.5 K 161.3 K 1.8 M
3 31 257 MiBytes B-tree 2.3 GiBytes 11.6 K 565.8 K 156.8 K 2.3 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Hash map 5.3 GiBytes 13.9 K 656.9 K 641.9 K 3.0 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Flat map 2.2 GiBytes 28.2 K 746.9 K 356.4 K 2.6 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Red/black tree 6.0 GiBytes 12.9 K 694.5 K 187.0 K 2.7 M
1 billion records
3 34 2.1 GiBytes B-tree (preload) 23 GiBytes 2.2 K 6.1 K 3.6 K 23.1 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes B-tree 23 GiBytes 2.6 K 85.8 K 3.7 K 114.9 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes Hash map 57 GiBytes – – 0.3 K 3.1 K
3 34 2.1 GiBytes Flat map 22 GiBytes – – 0.4 K 4.0 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes Red/black tree 60 GiBytes – – 0.1 K 1.4 K
Dashes indicate that 1 million queries were not completed in the 1,200 seconds allowed.
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We have created “hashdb” (hash database) for creating and 
maintaining hash databases.
“Hashdb” is a C++ package that provides:
• hashdb library — creates, searches, and manages hash databases
• hashdb command — manually building and searching database
• scan_hashdb — A “bulk_extractor” scanner — search for known content in bulk data.
“scan_hashid” — integrates hashdb with bulk_extractor
Available on github: 
• https://github.com/simsong/hashdb — the library
• https://github.com/simsong/bulk_extractor — bulk data research platform
Next steps:
• Testing hashdb in an operational environment.
• Create a hashdb with the sector hashes of every ingested device.
—64GB phone has 134M 512-byte sectors ≈ 6GB hashdb database
53
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With hashdb, we can field-deploy a billion-row hash 
database for triage and exhaustive search.
Use Case #1: Rapidly search for known content (contraband?):
• 1TB subject hard drive.  
• 10 min x 60 min/sec x 1000 msec/sec / 3 msec/sample = 200,000 samples
• Searching for a sector from a corpus of 512GB
• 100% recognition of a single sector; 0% false positive rate
Use Case #2: Find a single sector of known content:
• Time to read data & search database: 208 minutes
Technique is file type and file system agnostic 
—JPEG; Video; MSWord; Encrypted PDFs...
—provided data are not modified when copied or otherwise re-coded
54






Thursday, June 26, 14
Optimistic Decoding
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
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In addition to looking for known content,
forensic investigators search for “identity information.”
Applications:
• Watch lists
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There are two ways to find email addresses on a drive.
Approach #1: 
• Extract text from every file.
• Scan the files with regular expressions
Approach #2:
• Extract text from the “bulk data”
• Scan the text with regular expressions
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Email addresses are extracted from document files by 










COM TEXT TEXT  
TEXT TEXT
➼
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[bulk data] ➼ RegEx ➼ Email Addresses
Regular expressions can also extract email addresses from 






a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
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It’s easy to see plain email addresses in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
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Challenge: email addresses can be encoded in many ways.
XYZ@company.com
• Unicode: “XYZ@company.com” 
58 59 5a 40 63 6f 6d 70 61 6e 79 2e 63 6f 6d
• Base 16: “58595a40636f6d70616e792e636f6d0a”
3538 3539 3561 3430 3633 3666 3664 3730  58595a40636f6d70
3631 3665 3739 3265 3633 3666 3664 3061  616e792e636f6d0a
• Base 64: “WFlaQGNvbXBhbnkuY29tCg===”
5746 6c61 5147 4e76 6258 4268 626e 6b75  WFlaQGNvbXBhbnku
5932 3974 4367 3d3d 3d0a                 Y29tCg===.
• Compression: echo “XYZ@company.com” | compress | xxd
1f9d 9058 b268 0132 e64d 1b38 61dc e471  ...X.h.2.M.8a..q
51b0 8d02                                Q…
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Compression works by eliminating repeated sequences:
Computers use compression to save memory:
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  XYZ@company.com 
4142 4340 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  ABC@company.com 
4445 4640 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  DEF@company.com
Compressed with “gzip:”
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000            7.>..U..0...
Compressed email addresses do not “look” like email addresses!
—Forensic tools must decompress FIRST to identify compressed email addresses.
62
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It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
63
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Mother.JPG
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It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
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Example: Microsoft Word
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has been heavily used may contain important trace evidence that
can be revealed through no other approach. Optimistic methods
are generally unknown to today’s digital forensics practitioners
and unimplemented by today’s digital forensics tools. The pur-
pose of this article is to present the techniques and experimen-
tally determine their usefulness for recovering digital trace
evidence on a variety of media.
Materials and Methods
The term “digital trace evidence” is frequently used to describe
digital evidence that might have high probative value in a forensic
investigation. Examples of digital trace evidence include email
addresses, credit card numbers, and Internet search terms.
Although digital trace evidence may be insufficient to defini-
tively confirm or deny a hypothesis of an activity, the evidence
can be used for corroboration or for the production of new leads.
Thus, digital trace evidence is most useful during the investiga-
tion phase of a new case.
If optimistic techniques are generally useful for processing
digital trace evidence, then there should be digital trace evidence
that can be recovered no other way. This article proves that
hypothesis by showing that many used disk drives contain email
addresses in compressed data streams that are not contained
within recoverable files. These email addresses can only be
recovered through optimistic means.
The Conventional Forensic Pipeline
Modern computer forensic tools employ more-or-less the same
approach to process digital media. We call this approach the foren-
sic pipeline. The pipeline can be applied directly to subject media,
ideally connected to the examiner’s computer with a write-blocker
to prevent accidental media compromise, or it can be applied to a
sector-for-sector copy (a disk image) of the original media.
The forensic pipeline starts with the tool attempting to identify
disk partition and file system structures, collectively referred to
as filesystem metadata. Once identified, the pipeline enumerates
every directory and file on the disk image, each directory is
scanned, and each file is identified. For each file, the file type is
determined, text is extracted and optionally indexed, pictures and
videos are processed into thumbnails, and other format-specific
steps are executed. Because of varying engagement rules, most
of today’s tools can be programmed to process allocated files, or
both allocated and deleted files.
This top-down processing of computer media mirrors the way
that a layperson would most likely analyze the contents of a
drive. The process is easy to teach, easy to practice, and easy to
explain in court.
In many cases, additional steps are employed to recover evi-
dence from sectors that are unallocated and cannot be mapped to
deleted files or directories. This article refers to such sectors as
the non-file (NF) space. This space is typically processed with
regular expressions to scan for email addresses, credit card num-
bers, and other kinds of recognizable text, and with file carvers
such as Adroit (7) and PhotoRec (8) to recover digital images,
movies, and other kinds of media.
Conventional Extraction of Digital Trace Evidence
This section demonstrates why the simplistic strategy
described in the previous section does not work for many types
of files currently in use on digital computers.
Figure 1 shows Microsoft Word for Mac 2011 running on an
Apple Macintosh computer with an example document created
for this article. The document consists of the single sentence,
“One two three user@comapny.com four five six” followed by
two blank lines (Fig. 2). 3This file was saved three times: as a
Microsoft Word Binary File Format (9) (word1.doc) (Fig. 3); as
a Office Open XML (10) formatted files (word1.docx); and as
an Adobe Portable Document Format (11) file (word1.pdf) file
generated directly from Microsoft Word.
The 16-byte sequence user@company.com appears twice in
the file word1.doc: first in a mailto: link at offset 2595 and a
second time at offset 2614. Both 4of these are evident in the hex-
dump starting at location a00 shown in Fig. 3.
The file word1.docx does not obviously include the email
address. Microsoft’s “.docx” files are actually ZIP archives, and
the word1.docx archive contains 13 embedded files, including a
thumbnail of the document’s first page, a table of contents, a
table fonts, and other associated metadata (Fig. 4). The archive
also includes a compressed XML file called word/document.xml.
This compressed XML file at inside word1.docx at decimal off-
set 2451 and extends to offset 3225, for a total of 774 com-
pressed bytes (Fig. 5). If the embedded file is extracted from the
ZIP archive and decompressed, the result is 1990-byte XML file
with a email address at offset 1500 (Fig. 6).
Finally, the file word1.pdf is a PDF version 1.3 file that con-
tains three compressed binary streams occupying byte ranges
79–390, 713–3226, and 4278–21696. The first of these streams
contains the email address in question, but it is encoded. An
ASCII representation of the first 407 bytes of the file showing
the first stream, still compressed, appears in Fig. 7. The stream
is a ZLIB (12) compressed binary object. Decompressing the
object reveals the ASCII stream shown in Fig. 8, which is a ser-
ies of Adobe PDF commands. The text can be recovered by
combining the letters between the parentheses, producing the
string “One two three user@company.com four five six.”
All three files contain the email address user@company.com,
but each one encodes the trace evidence differently. Programs
that understand these file types (e.g., Oracle’s Outside In (13))
can extract the email address from all three files, provided that
the files are intact. However, an examiner searching a disk with
regular expressions or visually scanning the disk with a hex edi-
tor will discover only the email address from the file word1.doc,
as the sectors associated with the file word1.docx contain bytes
corresponding to compressed XML, while the sectors for
word1.pdf contains a compressed sequence of PDF commands.
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Word’s .doc format stores plain text (UTF-8 and UTF-16)
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Augmenting Extraction with Optimistic Decompression
Digital forensics tools that perform optimistic decompression
operate by searching for byte patterns indicative of compressed
data. When these byte patterns are identified, the tool attempts
to decompress the data. Any resulting data are then analyzed.
The preceding section presents two cases in which it is possi-
ble to recover forensic trace information through the use of opti-
mistic decompression. In the case of word1.docx, a useful
strategy is to search for ZIP local file headers and attempt to
decompress the compressed file data. In case of word1.pdf, a
useful strategy is to search for the six-character sequence
“stream” followed by a newline or a carriage return/newline pair,
a high entropy region, and finally, the nine-character sequence
“endstream”. (Please see (14) for a discussion of the ZIP archive
file format.) The high entropy region is then provided to zlib
(12) for attempted decompression. Sections of the PDF that are
successfully decompressed are then processed by a text extrac-
tion framework, which builds strings by combining the charac-
ters between parentheses. In this way, it is possible to extract
from encoded sections of a file even if the entire file is not pres-
ent or otherwise recoverable.
A Taxonomy of Digital Trace Evidence
Here, we present a classification scheme for describing how
trace evidence may be present on digital media. Because trace
evidence may be in a file or not in a file, and it may be in plain
text or encoded, trace evidence may thus exist on the subject
media in one of four conditions shown in Table 1.
In many cases, the same trace evidence is present in multiple
locations on target media. For example, an email address might
be downloaded as a compressed file but then decompressed in
memory, and the memory might be written to the system swap
partition. In such a case, there would be at least two copies of
FIG. 2––Three files resulting from saving the Microsoft Word file shown in 1 as a “.doc” file, a “.docx”, and a “.pdf.
FIG. 3––Hex dump of word1.doc.
FIG. 4––The file word1.docx is actually a ZIP archive; this listing shows
the archive’s component files.
FIG. 5––The ZIP local file header and compressed data for the word/document.xml component inside the file word1.docx. Each ZIP component begins with a
component header consisting of the hexadecimal sequence 50 4B 03 04 (“PK..” above) and ending with a variable length name field (“word/document.xml”)
and an optional “extra” field (not present in this case). ZLIB-compressed data begins at offset 9c1 in the above example.
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Word’s .docx format stores content as compressed XML
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Augmenting Extraction with Optimistic Decompression
Digital forensics tools that perform optimistic decompression
operate by searching for byte patterns indicative of compressed
data. When these byte patterns are identified, the tool attempts
to decompress the data. Any resulting data are then analyzed.
The preceding section presents two cases in which it is possi-
ble to recover forensic trace information through the use of opti-
mistic decompression. In the case of word1.docx, a useful
strategy is to search for ZIP local file headers and attempt to
decompress the compressed file data. In case of word1.pdf, a
useful strategy is to search for the six-character sequence
“stream” followed by a newline or a carriage return/newline pair,
a high entropy region, and finally, the nine-character sequence
“endstream”. (Please see (14) for a discussion of the ZIP archive
file format.) The high entropy region is then provided to zlib
(12) for attempted decompression. Sections of the PDF that are
successfully decompressed are then processed by a text extrac-
tion framework, which builds strings by combining the charac-
ters between parentheses. In this way, it is possible to extract
from encoded sections of a file even if the entire file is not pres-
ent or otherwise recoverable.
A Taxonomy of Digital Trace Evidence
Here, we present a classification scheme for describing how
trace evidence may be present on digital media. Because trace
evidence may be in a file or not in a file, and it may be in plain
text or encoded, trace evidence may thus exist on the subject
media in one of four conditions shown in Table 1.
In many cases, the same trace evidence is present in multiple
locations on target media. For example, an email address might
b downloaded as a compressed file but then decompressed in
memory, and the memory might be written to the system swap
partition. In such a case, there would be at least two copies of
FIG. 2––Three files resulting from saving the Microsoft Word file shown in 1 as a “.doc” file, a “.docx”, and a “.pdf.
FIG. 3––Hex dump of word1.doc.
FIG. 4––The file word1.docx is actually a ZIP archive; this listing shows
the archive’s component files.
FIG. 5––The ZIP local file header and compressed data for the word/document.xml component inside the file word1.docx. Each ZIP component begins with a
component header consisting of the hexadecimal sequence 50 4B 03 04 (“PK..” above) and ending with a variable length name field (“word/document.xml”)
and an optional “extra” field (not present in this case). ZLIB-compressed data begins at offset 9c1 in the above example.
































































the email address, one that was Type EF in the browser cache
and one that was Type PNF in the swap space.
To distinguish trace evidence that can be recovered through
conventional means from that which cannot, we assume that
conventional techniques can recover any feature found in a
recoverable file (types PF and EF), and that unencoded features
can be recovered from raw sectors without the need for
decompression or decoding (type PNF). Both of these assump-
tions overstate the capability of modern tools, resulting in results
that are more conservative than they might otherwise be.
Experimental Design
This experiment relies on bulk_extractor, a research tool can
scan and extract digital trace evidence in binary data using a
variety of recognition approaches such as regular expressions.
The tool can also detect data that are compressed or otherwise
encoded with a variety of algorithms. A list of supported enco-
dings appears in Table 2. Such data, when found, are decom-
pressed or decoded and then reprocessed by both trace evidence
scanners and the encoding detectors, a technique called recursive
FIG. 6––ASCII dump of a portion of the file word/document.xml after being decompressed and extracted from the file word1.docx; the string user@company.
com occurs at offset 5dc. (Line breaks have been added for legibility but do not occur in the source document.)
FIG. 7––ASCII representation of the first 407 characters of the file word1.pdf showing the first compressed stream at byte offsets 79–390. (Line breaks have
been added for legibility but do not occur in the source document.)
FIG. 8––The ASCII text stream produced when the binary stream in Fig. 7 is decompressed. (Line breaks have been added for legibility but do not occur in
the source document.)
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PDFs generated by Word are compressed PDF streams
68
Thursday, June 26, 14
Most digital forensic tools ignore compressed email 
addresses in bulk data.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......








—Windows Hibernation (Microsoft Xpress)
• Simple obfuscation
—ROT13, XOR(255)
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bulk_extractor is a leading bulk data analysis tool.
High-performance digital forensics tool runs on Windows/Mac/Linux
Identifies and extracts a wide variety of formatted info in free-formatted data:
• Domain Names; Email addresses; URLs
• Search terms; Facebook IDs; JSON data
• KML files; VCARDs
• ZIP & RAR files; Carved JPEGs; EXIF data
• PCAP files; Ethernet Addresses; TCP/IP Connections; etc.
• ELF & PE headers; Windows Prefetch files; Windows LNK files
Uses “optimistic” decoding to check every block/byte for:
• Compression — RAR, ZIP, GZIP
• Encoding — BASE64 / BASE85








—Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,
Computers & Security 32 (2013)
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bulk_extractor is our stream forensics program.
BE finds and extracts “features” from bulk data.
Output is a directory containing:
• feature files; histograms; carved objects
• Mostly in UTF-8; some XML
• Can be bundled into a ZIP file and process with bulk_extractor_reader.py
71









report.xml — log file
telephone.txt — list of phone numbers with context
telephone_histogram.txt — histogram of phone numbers
vcard/ — directory of VCARDs
...
“Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and Security 32 (2013) 56-72
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“Optimistic decoding” finds encoded email addresses by 
attempting to decode every byte with every algorithm.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Input sector:





Optimistic decoding is computationally expensive
• It uses all the cores on a 64-core machine!
• Is it worthwhile? 
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The Real Data Corpus (70TB)
• Disks, camera cards, & cell phones purchased on the “secondary market” (used).
• Most contain data from previous users.
• Mostly acquire outside the US:
—Canada, China, England, Germany, France, 
India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Palestine, etc.
• Thousands of devices (HDs, CDs, DVDs, flash, etc.)
The problems we encounter obtaining, curating and exploiting this data 
mirror those of national organizations
—Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev and Dinolt, Bringing Science to Digital Forensics with 
Standardized Forensic Corpora, DFRWS 2009
http://digitalcorpora.org/ 
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We used the “Real Data Corpus” to understand the potential 
of optimistic decoding in real investigations.
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We searched 1646 used storage devices for email addresses that could 
only be recovered with bulk data analysis and optimistic decoding.
Survey of Encoded Non-File email addresses.
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The same email address may be both places.









Thursday, June 26, 14











Thursday, June 26, 14







Thursday, June 26, 14








Thursday, June 26, 14












Thursday, June 26, 14
There are four different conditions for an email address on 
the media.
Condition #4 is invisible
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We processed the real data corpus with bulk_extractor
84
1646 used storage devices
Extractors
1646 sets of:
• extracted email addresses 
• encoding of each email
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“Feature files” contain the extracted email addresses.
Plain text features have numeric offsets:  
392175418








392175418    WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com   Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com\015\012
...
3772517888-GZIP-28322  user@company.com  onterey-<nobr>user@company.com</nobr>
...
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Post-processing with identify_files.py reveals file names
Offset:  392175418  
Feature: WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
Context:!\012[User]\015\012Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
         \015\012Password=B@ji0
Filename:WINDOWS/system32/oobe/migx25a.dun 
MD5:     2b00042f7481c7b056c4b410d28f33cf      
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For each drive:
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Email addresses were present with many different 
encodings
Example email addresses (sanitized)
Questions:
• How common are compressed email addresses in unallocated space?
• Is this technique worth the effort?
91
Encoding  Email Address (■Sanitized)        Note
========  ==========================        ====
GZIP      ■■■■@■■■■■.dk                     PII
ZIP       ■■■■■■@desktopsidebar.com         PII
HIBER     ntIV@std.do                       false positive
ZIP       ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■@digital.com      source code?
ZIP       pcg@goof.com                      ECGS Compiler
ZIP       andrew@northwindtraders.com       MS Office Sample
ZIP       ActiveSh@eet.Na                   false positive
GZIP      linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net  mailing list
Thursday, June 26, 14
135 out of 5700 email addresses are invisible to existing tools.







Cleartext 358 -- 5341 --
All Comp -- 9 -- 135
GZIP 50 14 36
HIBER 39 7 32
HIBER-GZIP 23 23
PDF 88 1 87
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1,646 RDCdisk images that had intact file systems. 
Many email addresses existed only in Encoded NonFile.
93
Some drives had more than 10,000 compressed email addrs.
Coding                                 Drives    Emails   avg     max     σ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Plain in files                         739    81,920   110   4,206   253
2) Comp in files                          355    19,711    55   5,454   388
3) Plain in non-files                     860 1,956,059 2,274 178,073 9,248
4) Comp in non-files                      474   165,481   349  59,376 2,889
          BASE64 Comp                      54       219     4      50     7
          BASE64-GZIP Comp                  2        64    32      37     5
          GZIP Comp                       234    66,195   282   9,103   981
          GZIP-BASE64 Comp                  7        44     6      11     3
          GZIP-GZIP Comp                   15    12,663   844  11,845 2,944
          GZIP-GZIP-BASE64 Comp             2        38    19      30    11
          GZIP-GZIP-GZIP Comp               4        58    14      38    14
          GZIP-GZIP-ZIP Comp                1        12    12      12     0
        GZIP-PDF Comp                     5        38     7      30    11
          GZIP-ZIP Comp                     6        49     8      30     9
          HIBER Comp                       79     1,433    18     217    44
          PDF Comp                        162     2,352    14     238    31
          ZIP Comp                        388    85,252   219  59,369 3,025
          ZIP-BASE64 Comp                   5        30     6      13     5
          ZIP-BASE64-GZIP Comp              2        65    32      38     5
         ZIP-GZIP Comp                    14       261    18     132    34
         ZIP-PDF Comp                     26       115     4      18     4
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HIBER-GZIP were downloaded by HTTP and saved in Hibernation
Example:
• JSON object downloaded from Facebook by compressed HTTP
• In RAM, written to HIBER on disk when the system went into sleep.
The encoding type reveals the email address source.
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...
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-1526   groups-noreply@linkedin.com   3d\134"groups-noreply@linkedin.com
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2018   m■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■@gmail.com  3d\134"m■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■@gmail.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2128   sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2625   ■■■■■■■.consultancy@gmail.com 3d\134"■■■■■■■.consultancy@gmail.c
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2736   sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3186   san■■■■@■■■■■■■■■■■.com       \134" "san■■■■@■■■■■■■■■■■.com\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3685   Careers@■■■■■■bank.com        3d\134"Careers@■■■■■■bank.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4124   par■■■■@team■■■■■■.com        3d\134"par■■■■@team■■■■■■.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4149   u003epar■■■■@team■■■■■■.com   \134u003epar■■■■@team■■■■■■.com\13
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4607   d■■■■.■■■■■@gmail.com         3d\134"d■■■■.■■■■■@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4631   u003ed■■■■.■■■■■@gmail.com    \134u003ed■■■■.■■■■■@gmail.com\134
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5114   raj■■■■■■@bsnl.in             3d\134"raj■■■■■■@bsnl.in\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5558   kiran.■■■@■■■■technology.com  3d\134"kiran.■■■@■■■■technology.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5671   sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur■■■■■■■1@gmail.com\134"\
...
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Conclusion: 
• Optimistic decoding uncovers important information that is otherwise missed.
Manual examination reveals the provenance of each type.
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Encoding Source Relevant?
BASE64 Email messages sent as 
attachments
YES
BASE64-GZIP Source code sent as 
attachments
NO
GZIP HTML & JSON
(Browser cache)
YES
HIBER Program memory YES
ZIP Software Distributions NO
ZIP-PDF Archives of PDFs YES
ZIP-ZIP-ZIP WinZip Archives NO
“The Prevalence of Encoded Digital Trace Evidence in Nonfile space of computer media,” 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, to appear 2014
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Where do we go from here?
A DF research agenda
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Engineering — embrace diversity & scale.
• Support the increasing number of data formats and encodings (master’s projects)
• Support for new kinds of devices (SCADA, cars, etc.)
• Develop fault-tolerant high-performance architecture for data analysis
• Migration from desktop analysis to “cloud” analysis
—Analysis with Hadoop or Google App Engine
Science — better techniques.
• Approaches for finding data relevant to the case at hand.
• Approaches that work with encrypted data (storage, network, memory)
• Approaches for cross-case correlation. (Privacy-preserving anonymous matching.)
—Applications to law enforcement & digital humanities
• Cloud-based acquisition & analysis
—How do we acquire and stabilize information?
• Integration with social network analysis; 
Math and Science:
• Linguistics, Natural Language Processing & Machine Learning
What’s the DF research agenda?
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Please try our tools!
bulk_extractor, a high-performance stream-based feature extractor
• https://github.com/simsong/bulk_extractor  (dev tree)
• http://digitalcorpora.org/downloads/bulk_extractor (downloads)
—Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,
Computers & Security 32 (2013), 
hashdb — high-performance database for sector hashes
• https://github.com/simsong/hashdb
DFXML — An XML language for doing computer forensics
• provenance, file extraction, hashes and piecewise-hashes, registry values, etc.
• https://github.com/simsong/dfxml 
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